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TITLE VI CHALLENGES BY PRIVATE
PARTIES TO THE LOCATION OF
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES: TOWARD A
JUST AND EFFECTIVE ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Health care services are vital to all members of society; people
must be healthy to obtain other societal benefits,' Nevertheless, com-
mentators continue to report racial discrimination in the provision of
health care services.' The law forbids intentional discrimination on the
basis of race in a variety of contexts.' Victims of discrimination, how-
ever, often cannot demonstrate that the discrimination they faced was
intentional.4 In addition, facially neutral policies that have a dispropor-
tionate effect in excluding minorities from care result in discrimina-
tion just as powerful as intentional discrimination.' Civil rights laws
I See Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet
the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 131 (1993).
2 See, e.g., id. at 192; Raphael Metzger, Hispanics, Health Care, and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Winter 1993-94 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 31, 31-32; Jane Perkins, Race Discrimination
in America's Health Care System, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE Rev. 571, 373 (Special Issue 1993); Sidney
D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C. L REv. 1647, 1648
(1993) [hereinafter Watson, Inner City]; Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending
Health Care Discrimination—It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 941 (1990)
[hereinafter Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI]. Perkins notes, however, that the extent of discrimi-
nation is hard to determine because of inadequate and inconsistent data collection. Perkins,
supra, at 377.
This Note will generally employ the nonspecific term minority. When authorities cited refer
to specific minority groups, the terminology of the cited source has been adopted.
3 Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 943 & n.21 (citing Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 1971
(1982) (voting rights); Title II, id. § 2000a (public accommodations); Title 111, id. § 20006
(establishments affecting interstate commerce); Title IV, id. § 2000c to -9 (public education);
Title V, id. § 1975a-d (U.S. Civil Rights Commission); Title VI, id. § 2000d to -4 (federally funded
programs and activities); Title VII, id. § 2000e to -15 (employment); Title VIII, id. § 2000f
(Secretary of Commerce to compile registration and voting statistics); Title IX, 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(1982) (procedure after removal of suits from state to federal court; authorization of Attorney
General to intervene in civil rights suits); Title X, 42 U.S.C. § 2000g to -3 (community relations
service); Title XI, id. § 2000h to -6 (miscellaneous provisions)). Watson notes that prior to the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, health care facilities openly discriminated against African
Americans. Id. at 940.
4 See Mitchell A. Horwich, Note, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Closing of a Public
Hospital, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1033, 1034 (1981).
5 See Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 941-42. A variety of language is used
to distinguish between intentional discrimination and unintentional discrimination that has a
discriminatory effect. See Randall, supra note 1, at 190 (intentional discrimination referred to as
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have contributed to the decline in overt discrimination.' Thus, chal-
lenging facially neutral policies that have a disparate impact on minor-
ity groups is an important means of closing the gap that still exists in
this country between the health status of minority and nonminority
groups.'
Locating health care facilities in areas inaccessible to minority
populations discriminates against members of minority groups; few
people, however, have challenged this subtle form of disparate impact
discrimination.' The inequitable placement of health facilities discrimi-
nates against minorities more effectively than discriminatory policies
that come into play once patients walk through the door because some
individuals may not even attempt to use more distant facilities. 9 Never-
theless, commentators find that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Tide VI") has provided little assistance in ending health care dis-
crimination.m Although plaintiffs in one recent challenge to the loca-
tion of a hospital succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction
based on Title VI," the court in another recent challenge to the
relocation of health care services dismissed the case before reaching
the merits. 12
 Because hospitals currently can defend with ease facially
"disparate treatment discrimination" and unintentional discrimination referred to as "dispropor-
tionate adverse impact discrimination"); Watson, Reinvigorating Tide VI, supra note 2, at 942
(unintentional discrimination generally referred to as "disproportionate impact"). This Note will
refer to unintentional discrimination caused by facially neutral policies as disparate impact
discrimination.
Watson provides the following example of disparate impact; hospitals that require patients
to have a treating physician before they can be admitted effectively discriminate against minority
populations, even though there may be a valid medical reason for the requirement. Watson,
Reinvigorating Title 14, supra note 2, at 941-42. The requirement of a primary physician ensures
that admitted patients have someone to provide care; it has the effect of disproportionately
excluding from hospital care minorities, who more frequently lack a primary physician. See id. at
941-42 & n.15.
6 Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 941; Horwich, supra note 4, at 1059.
7 See Perkins, supra note 2, at 379. It is important to note, however, that discrimination on
the basis of race is not the only reason that health outcomes are different for majority and
minority group members. Id. at 373. Economic disparities form significant barriers to health care
access as well. Id. This Note will focus only on disparate impact discrimination in health care as
it relates to race; other contributing factors are beyond the scope of this Note.
ti
	 v. County of Contra Costa, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 25-26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1,
1994); Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 966-67;
Horwich, supra note 4, at 1058.
See Richard j. Zall, Note, Maintaining Health Care in the Inner City: Title VI and Hospital
Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 271, 276 (1980).
°Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 942; Horwich, supra note 4, at 1059-60.
Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 32-33.
L 2 See Mussington v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 427, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
aff'd, 18 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994).
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neutral policies with a discriminatory impact, significant questions still
remain about the viability of this cause of action.' 3
Health care reform is a major initiative in this country today."
Efforts to reform the health care system received national attention in
1994, but so far have failed, 15 Discussion of reform plans, however,
continues." Given the potential for future change in the health care
industry, Title VI challenges to the location of health care facilities may
assume increased importance.' 7
For many, achieving racial equality in health care through the
enforcement of civil rights is an important national policy." Given the
slow progress in reducing and eliminating discrimination, activists also
seek to prevent systemwide reform efforts from inadvertently widening
the current gap between health care services offered to minority and
nonminority individuals." Strengthening Title VI will help accomplish
these objectives."
This Note explores the legal issues surrounding judicial enforce-
ment of civil rights challenges by private parties to the location of
health care facilities. Part I discusses Tide VI in general, focusing on
its implementing regulations and on judicial interpretation of the
statute. 21 Part II details the history and current state of the law in Title
VI actions as it relates to the location of health care facilities. 22 Part III
argues that the burden on plaintiffs in Title VI cases should be de-
creased and provides three specific proposals .,for doing so: allowing
plaintiffs to benefit from the "continuing violation" doctrine, removing
the burden currently placed on plaintiffs to provide a less discrimina-
tory alternative to a challenged plan, and eliminating the distinction
currendy made between the Tide VI regulations and the Title VI
statute itself."
13 See Randall, supra note 1, at 190; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 942.
14 Randall, supra note 1, at 130; see Louise G. Trubek & Elizabeth A, Hoffmann, Searching
for a Balance in Universal Health Care Reform: Protection for the Disenfranchised Consumer, 43
DEPAUL L. Ray. 1081, 1081 (1994).
° Adam Clymer, Hillary Clinton Says Administration Was Misunderstood on Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at Al2,
16 1d.
17 See Randall, supra note 1, at 193; see also David F. Chavkin, Health Access and the Civil Rights
Laws: The Smoking Gun and Other Sorrows, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE Rev. 561, 566 (1981).
18 See Kenneth Wing, Title VI and Health Facilities: Forms Without Substance, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
137, 138 (1978); see also Perkins, supra note 2, at 381; Randall, supra note 1, at 193.
19 See Perkins, supra note 2, at 381, 383; see also Randall, supra note 1 at 193.
° Randall, supra note 1, at 193; see Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 943.
21 See infra notes 24-122 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 123-277 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 278-311 and accompanying text.
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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF TITLE VI
Congress intended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act") to
eliminate discrimination in the United States in a variety of areas. 24
Title VI of the Act prohibits discrimination in the use of federal funds. 25
The statute is ambiguous, however, with respect to what constitutes
discrimination. 26 It provides, in pertinent part: "[n] o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."27 The grant of authority in Title VI is
based on Congress's spending power, through which Congress may not
only prohibit certain conduct, but also may place conditions on receipt
of funds. 28 Title VI explicitly authorizes various departments to prom-
ulgate and enforce regulations. 29 The scope of Title VI is substantively
laid out in these regulations. 8°
A. Agency Regulations Implementing Title VI
Agency regulations implement the broad antidiscrimination man-
date of Title VI.81 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW"), which is now the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"), promulgated the first set of administrative regulations imple-
menting Title VI. 52 Because the language of Title VI lacks specificity,
24 See Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 941, 943 n.21; see also Charles F.
Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining "Discrimination", 70 CEO.
L.J. 1, 4-10 (1981) (detailing the legislative history of Title VI); Wing, supra note 18, at 147-54
(discussing the legislative history of both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VI).
25 Abernathy, supra note 24, at 1; Wing, supra note 18, at 137.
26
 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) (White, J., plurality
opinion).
Y7 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
28
 Guardians, 463 U.S. , at 598-99 (White, J., plurality opinion); Watson, Reinvigorating Title
VI, supra note 2, at 943-44. In contrast, Title VII, which seeks to regulate private employer-em-
ployee relationships, is based on the Commerce Clause, and thus takes the form of a prohibition
against discrimination, not conditions on the receipt of funds. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI,
supra note 2, at 943-44.
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000c1-1 (1988). The Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") is charged with investigat-
ing complaints under Title VI. Wing, supra note 18, at 161-62.
5° See 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1994).
81 See id.; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592 (White, J., plurality opinion); Watson, Reinvigorating
Title VI, supra note 2, at 945.
52 See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1980); Wing, supra note 18, at 154. Other
agencies patterned their regulations after those of HEW. Wing, supra note 18, at 154 n.60.
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the Supreme Court has looked to the agency regulations to interpret
and enforce the statute."
The HHS regulations seek to enforce the mandate of Title VI,
namely preventing racial discrimination." They apply to all programs
for which the federal government provides financial aid. 35 In addition
to a general prohibition against discrimination, the regulations pro-
hibit a specific list of discriminatory practices. 36 Prohibited practices
35 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592 (White, J., plurality opinion).
54 45 C.F.R. § 80.1. Section 80.1 indicates that:
The purpose of this part is to effectuate the provisions of title V1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (hereafter referred to as the 'Act') to the end that no person in the
United States shall; on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
from the Department of Health and Human Services.
Id.
55 Id. § 80.2. Section 80.2 provides that: 'This regulation applies to any program for which
Federal financial assistance is authorized to be extended to a recipient under a law administered
by the Department, including the Federal assisted programs and activities listed in appendix A
to this part." Id. Among the programs and activities listed in Appendix A are the following: grants
for construction or modernization of emergency rooms of general hospitals; supplementary
medical insurance benefits for the aged; and grants, loans and loan guarantees with interest
subsidies for hospital and medical facilities. Id. at Appendix A Part 1 11 63, 121, Part 2 1 22.
" Id. § 80.3. Section 80.3(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A recipient under any program to which this part applies may not, directly or
through contractual or other arrangements, on ground of nice, color, or national
origin:
(i) Deny an individual any service, financial aid, or other benefit provided under
the program;
(ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which is
different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to others under
the program;
(iii) Subject an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any matter
related to his receipt of any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the
program;
(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or
privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other benefit
under the program;
(v) Treat an individual differently from others in determining whether he satisfies
any admission, enrollment, quota, eligibility, membership or other requirement or
condition which individuals must meet in order to he provided any service, financial
aid, or other benefit provided under the program;
(2) A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other benefits,
or facilities which will be provided under any such program, or the class of indi-
viduals to whom, or the situations in which, such services, financial aid, other
benefits, or facilities will be provided under any such program, .. may not, directly
or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of ad-
ministration which have the effect ofsubjecting individuals to discrimination because
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include both providing an individual a lesser opportunity to participate
in the program than that offered to othersr and locating facilities with
the effect of excluding individuals from the programs provided. 33
The regulations apply to any program receiving federal funds and
to each agency and institution running those programs in their en-
tirety. 39 In addition, each institution receiving funds must provide as-
surances that it complies with the nondiscrimination requirement. 49
One commentator notes that health care facilities were not empha-
sized during the debate around Title VI. 4 ' The regulations provide
of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals
of a particular race, color, or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
"Id. § 80.3(b) (1) (vi). The restriction provides: "[A recipient may not] [clieny an individual
an opportunity to participate in the program through the provision of services or otherwise or
afford him an opportunity to do so which is different front that afforded others under the
program . . ." Id.
38 Id. § 80.3(6)(3). The specific restriction provides:
In determining the site or location of a facilities [sic], an applicant or recipient may
not make selections with the effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the
benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any programs to which this
regulation applies, on the ground of race, color, or national origin; or with the
purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
objectives of the Act or this regulation.
Id. (emphasis added).
59 45	 § 80.2; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988) (defining "program or activity" and
"program"); Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 945. Congress passed the Civil Rights
Restoration Act in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555 (1984). See Metzger, supra note 2, at 34. Grove City held that the antidiscrimination
coverage of Tide IX was limited only to the program or activity receiving federal funds, not the
institution as a whole. 465 U.S. at 573-74. The Court also noted that Title IX was analogous to
Title Vl. Id. at 566. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 extended Tide VI nondiscrimination
provisions "throughout an entire agency or institution if any part receives federal financial
assistance." Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 945 & n.39 (citing the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stai 28 (1988)).
40 45 C.F.R. § 80.4 (1994). Section 80.4(d) provides the following:
(2) The assurance required with respect to an institution of higher education,
hospital, or any other institution, insofar as the assurance relates to the institution's
practices with respect to admission or other treatment of individuals as students,
patients, or clients of the institution or to the opportunity to participate in the
provision of services or other benefits to such individuals, shall be applicable to the
entire institution unless the applicant establishes, to the satisfaction of the respon-
sible Department official, that the institution's practices in designated parts or
programs of the institution will in no way affect its practices in the program of the
institution for which Federal financial assistance is sought, or the beneficiaries of
or participants in such program. If in any such case the assistance sought is for the
construction of a facility or part of a facility, the assurance shall in any event extend to
the entire facility and to facilities operated in connection therewith.
Id. § 80.4(2) (emphasis added).
41 Wi ng, supra note 18, at 152.
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illustrative examples, however, which include references to health care
facilities.42 The illustrations also provide an example of how placement
of a project in a location with a discriminatory effect might be imper-
missible' Thus, even though health care facilities may not have been
the primary focus of Title VI, they are nonetheless covered by Title
VI's broad scope."
Although the regulations prohibit both discrimination in general
and certain discriminatory activities, they do not provide a general
definition of discrimination.° Commentators and the courts recognize
that Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination, but disagree about
whether the statute itself or the regulations implementing the statute
prohibit disparate impact discrimination. 46 The regulations, commen-
tators note, indicate agency intent to prohibit acts that have a discrimi-
natory impact despite their lack of discriminatory intent. 47 The United
42 45 C.F.R. § 80.5. The regulations state:
(e) In grants to assist in the construction of facilities for the provision of health,
educational or welfare services, assurances will be required that services will be
provided without discrimination, to the same extent that discrimination would be
prohibited as a condition of Federal operating grants for the support of such
services. .. . In [the] case of hospital construction grants the assurance will apply to
patients, to interns, residents, student nurses, and other trainees, and to the privi-
lege of physicians, dentists, and other professionally qualified persons to practice
in the hospital, and will apply to the entire facility for which, or for a part of which,
the grant is made, and to facilities operated in connection therewith.
Id. (emphasis added).
48 Id. (illustrative examples section).
(h) A recipient may not take action that is calculated to bring about indirectly what
this regulation forbids it to accomplish directly. Thus, a State, in selecting or approv-
ing projects or sites for the construction of public libraries which will receive Federal
financial assistance, may not base its selections or approvals on criteria which have the
effect of defeating or of substantially impairing accomplishments [sic] of the objectives
of the Federal assistance as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or
national origin.
Id. § 80.5(h) (emphasis added).
44 Wing, supra note 18, at 152.
45 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3 (discrimination prohibited), 80.13 (definitions section); Watson, Inner
City, supra note 2, at 1670; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 948.
*See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 951-54; Abernathy, supra note 24,
at 17.
47 Perkins, supra note 2, at 379; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 948. The
regulations provide, in part, the following:
[a] recipient . . . may not ... utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color,
or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accom-
plishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular
race, color, or national origin.
45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (2) (emphasis added). Other parts of the regulations, however, permit some
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States Supreme Court has agreed that the Title VI regulations do, in
fact, incorporate the disparate impact definition of discrimination."
The regulations also provide an enforcement procedure for vio-
lations.49
 One author notes that, in contrast to other titles of the
Civil Rights Act, Congress intended Title VI to be enforced primarily
through administrative rather than judicial channels." The Office of
Civil Rights ("OCR") handles Title VI enforcement, including that for
health care facilities. 51
 The regulations permit OCR to attempt to
obtain compliance among fund recipients through voluntary or infor-
mal means.52
 If an applicant still fails to comply with the requirements,
the governing agency may then terminate the federal funding, but only
after giving the recipient an opportunity for a hearing. 53 Recipients
who have their funding terminated may seek judicial review of agency
action." Programs that receive federal funds but are found to discrimi-
nate are thus given a choice: stop the discriminatory practice or lose
federal funds. 55
OCR also receives and reviews individual complaints of Title VI
violations.56
 Some commentators, however, question the efficiency of
the administrative complaint process. 57
 Others criticize OCR more
broadly, claiming that since Title VI's enactment, health care enforce-
ment efforts have been inadequate." One commentator notes that
under the Reagan and Bush administrations, OCR almost completely
difference in impact on varying groups where the impact serves the goal of eliminating past
discrimination. Id. §§ 80.3(b) (6), 80.5(j). A discussion of this "affirmative action" is beyond the
scope of this Note. See id. § 80.3(b) (6).
48 See, e.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 n.27 (White, J., plurality opinion).
49
 45 C.F.R. § 80.8.
5° Watson, Reinvigorating Title W, supra note 2, at 945-46.
51 Wing, supra note 18, at 161-62. Wing states:
OCR fulfills its Title VI responsibilities to health facilities primarily through four
activities: (1) requiring Title VI assurances from health facilities certified for par-
ticipation in the Medicare program; (2) requiring state agencies to submit Title VI
compliance plans describing state enforcement activities; (3) investigating com-
plaints and noncomplying recipients identified by assurance documentation; (4)
conducting occasional special studies.
Id. at 163.
52
 45 C.F.R. § 80.8(a), (c).
53 Id. § 80.8(b), (c); Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 946.
54
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(2); 45 C.F.R. § 80.11.
55 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983) (quoting 110 CONG. REC.
1542 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay)).
56
 Randall, supra note 1, at 189; Wing, supra note 18, at 163.
57 See Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Randall, supra note 1, at 189. The administrative com-
plaint process is described at 42 C.F.R. § 80.7.
58 See Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1669; Wing, supra note 18, at 138.
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abdicated its Title VI health care monitoring and enforcement respon-
sibilities. 59 OCR's failure to produce data with which to evaluate Title
VI compliance is also a source of criticism from scholars.` OCR, how-
ever, has not been the only body to enforce and interpret Title VI; the
courts also have done so. 6 '
B. Judicial Elaboration of the Title VI Regulations
The Title VI regulations leave some issues unresolved.62 Courts
have considered several of these issues: whether the plaintiff must show
actual intentional discrimination or merely disparate impact in order
to support a finding of discrimination;65 whether a private cause of
action exists aside from the administrative enforcement scheme; 64 and
the available remedies under Title VI.65 In a series of cases, the United
States Supreme Court has addressed the initial question of whether
discriminatory impact or disparate treatment is required for a plaintiff
to prevail under Title VI and analogous statutes.''''
For example, in 1974, in Lau v. Nichols, the United States Supreme
Court held that a public school program that provided unequal bene-
fits to English and non-English speaking children violated Title VI. 67
In Lau, a group of non-English speaking Chinese students brought suit
against their school on the grounds that the school's failure to provide
supplemental courses in the English language had a discriminatory
impact on them.° The Court decided the case on Title VI grounds;
after examining the regulations it concluded that disparate impact
discrimination is prohibited.69 The Court reasoned that the federal
"Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1669.
6° Perkins, supra note 2, at 377; Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1669. There are only two
studies analyzing Title VI compliance by health facilities: one conducted by the General Account-
ing Office in 1971-72 and a limited survey of hospital compliance by OCR in 1981. Watson, Inner
City, supra note 2, at 1669-70 & n.114.
61 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); University of Cal. Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
62 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 589-97, 607; see also Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2,
at 946.
65 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 589-93 (White, J., plurality opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287; Lau,
414 U.S. at 568.
m Guardians, 463 U.S. at 593-95, 597; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 946.
65 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 & n.27.
66 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 11.7, 294 (1985) (interpreting § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation At of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 and its implementing regulations); Guardians, 463 U.S. at
607 & n.27; Lau, 414 U.S. at 568.
67 414 U.S. at 564-66, 569.
69 See id. at 564.
69 Id. at 566-68.
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government has the power to fix the terms on which federal funds are
distributed and that, in this case, it had not exceeded that power."
Thus, the Supreme Court, in Lau, held that Title VI prohibits discrimi-
natory effects in federally funded programs. 7'
In 1983, in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission, a majority
of the United States Supreme Court held that proof of discriminatory
intent was not necessary to establish a violation of the Title VI regula-
tions;72 the Court, however, did require a showing of discriminatory
intent to establish a violation of the Title VI statute itself." In Guardi-
ans, the plaintiffs were minority police officers who contended that a
qualifying examination with a non-job-related discriminatory impact
resulted in disproportionate layoffs in violation of Title VI. 74 Respon-
dents argued that the Court, in 1978, had confined the reach of Title
VI to programs operated in an intentionally discriminatory manner,
thereby overruling Lau.75 The Guardians Court, however, chose to
leave intact the holding of Lau as it related to the Title VI regulations. 76
70 Id. at 569.
71 See id. at 568-69.
72
 463 U.S. 582,584 & n.2 (1983) (White, J., plurality opinion).
75 Id, at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). As to the issue of remedies, the Court upheld the
court of appeals, which had reversed the district court's grant of compensatory damages. Id. at
584,587-88 (White, J., plurality opinion). In addition, the Supreme Court implied a private right
of action under Tide Vi in this case. Id. at 597 (White, J., plurality opinion); see also Perkins,
supra note 2, at 379-80.
The Guardians opinion is complex; Justice Powell expressed his reservation about the Court's
opinion as follows: "[o]ur opinions today will confuse rather than guide." 463 U.S. at 608 (Powell,
J., concurring). Seven members of the Court shared the opinion that violation of the Title VI
statute itself requires proof of discriminatory intent: Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger. See id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
The members of the Court holding that the Tide VI regulations, which incorporate a disparate
impact standard, are valid were the following: Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens. Id. at 607 n.27 (White, J., plurality opinion). A specific analysis of the validity of the Title
VI regulations, as opposed to the scope of the statute itself, is first raised in a concurring opinion
in Lau. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court has allowed the regulations to stand
because they are consistent with the purposes of Title VI. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591-92 (White,
J., concurring). The Court found that "those charged with enforcing Title VI had sufficient
discretion to enforce the statute by forbidding unintentional as well as intentional discrimina-
tion." Id.
74 See Lau, 414 U.S. at 585-86.
75 See id. at 589-90. Respondents argued that University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), had limited Lau. Id. at 589. Bakke concerned a challenge to the admissions policy
of a school in which 16 of 100 positions were reserved for disadvantaged minority students. See
438 U.S. at 279. The Bakke Court held that the program was unlawful and the student challenging
the policy must be admitted. See id. at 271. The Court also held, however, that the school was
allowed to consider race as a factor in the admissions process. See id. at 272 (Powell, J., plurality
opinion). The Guardians Court reasoned that because Bakke dealt with affirmative action, its
holding was consistent with Lau, which dealt with nonbenign discriminations. 463 U.S. at 590
(White, J., plurality opinion).
76 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 590,623,643.
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The Court upheld the validity of the Title VI regulations prohib-
iting disparate impact discrimination, even though it found that the
Title VI statute itself does not forbid such discrimination." Failing to
find an inconsistency between the regulations and the purpose of the
statute and the legislative history, and noting that Title VI had been
consistently administered for almost two decades without interference
by Congress, the Court allowed the regulations to stand. 78 Thus,
Guardians reaffirmed that only a showing of disparate impact was
required for plaintiffs to prevail in a case brought under the Title VI
regulations."
In 1985, in Alexander v. Choate, the United States Supreme Court
revisited the issue of disparate impact discrimination while deciding a
case brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 80 The Court, look-
ing to the standard under Title VI and citing Guardians, held that a
claim based on a reduction in the number of annual days of hospital
care covered in a state Medicaid program was not cognizable. 8 ' The
Alexander Court reasoned that some acts of discrimination would be
difficult or impossible to reach if limited to prohibition of intentional
discrimination.82 It confirmed Guardians as standing for the proposi-
tion that the Tide VI regulations do not require a showing of discrimi-
natory intent." The Court reaffirmed, however, that intentional dis-
crimination is necessary to show a violation of Title VI itself." Thus, in
Alexander; as it had in Lau and Guardians before, the Supreme Court
held that the Title VI regulations prohibit disparate impact discrimi-
nation."
The Guardians holding regarding intent, however, was not its only
one; the case also clarified issues relating to available remedies under
" See id. at 589-93, 607 n.27 (White, J., plurality opinion); id. at 627 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"See id. at 592-93,607 n.27 (White, J., plurality opinion); id. at 627 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 See id. at 607 n.27 (White, J., plurality opinion).
8°469 U.S. 287,289,292 (1985).
8I Id. at 289,292-93 & n.7. In Alexander, plaintiffs claimed that a reduction in the number
of inpatient hospital days paid for by the state Medicaid program from 20 to 14 had a dispropor-
tionate impact on the handicapped, Id. at 289. Defendants asserted that the Rehabilitation Act
reached only purposeful discrimination. Id. at 292. The Court, while noting that extending the
Act's protection to all cases of disparate impact could make the action unmanageable, found that
the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act showed an intent to extend it to cover some acts
with a discriminatory impact against the handicapped. See id. at 296-98. Ultimately, the Court
found that the discriminatory impact alleged in this case was not actionable under the Rehabili-
tation Act. See id. at 309.
82 Id. at 293,294.
85 Id.
84 Id. at 293.
" See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text,
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Title V1. 89 In Guardians, the Supreme Court held that compensatory
relief is not available as a remedy for Title VI violations in private
actions not involving intentional discrimination." In a portion of the
opinion written by Justice White and joined by Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White reasoned that private actions seeking relief for violations
of statutes such as Title VI, which are passed under Congress's power
under the Spending Clause, are not ordinarily appropriate for mone-
tary relief." The two Justices also justified this result because receipt
of federal funds under typical Spending Clause legislation is a consen-
sual matter; the grantee weighs the benefits and burdens before ac-
cepting the funds and agrees to comply with the conditions attached
to their receipt but is free to withdraw from the receipt of funds if
unanticipated burdens arise." Justice O'Connor denied the availability
of compensatory relief in this case because she reasoned that the Title
VI regulations prohibiting disparate impact were invalid. 90
 Justice Pow-
ell and ChiefJustice Burger reasoned that compensatory damages were
not available because Congress did not intend to authorize a private
right of action under Title VI and, therefore, the plaintiffs had no
claim.9 ' Thus, in Title VI cases relying only on a showing of disparate
impact, the Court in Guardians limited recovery to equitable relief.92
In 1992, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme
Court held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title
IX"), a statute analogous to Title VI, allowed an award of monetary
damages for an intentional violation of the statute." The plaintiff, a
female high school student, alleged continuing sexual harassment
from a sports coach and teacher employed by the school system; she
also alleged that the system, despite knowledge of what was occurring,
had failed to halt the harassment." The Court stated the general rule
88 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 n.27 (Whited, plurality opinion).
87 Id. No majority explicitly addressed the issue of whether compensatory relief might be
available in cases of Title VI violations demonstrating intentional discrimination. See id.
88 See id. at 596. These justices stated that this presumption against monetary relief could be
overcome by persuasive evidence of contrary legislative intent, but failed to find any in the case
of Title Vl. Id. at 599, 602.
89 Id. at 596.
99 Id. at 615 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608-10 (Powell, j., concurring).
"2 Id, at 607 n.27.
93 112 S, Ct. 1028, 1031, 1032 (1992); see 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (1994); see also Guardians,
463 U.S. at 594 ("Congress understood that private remedies were available under Title VI, and
... intended similar remedies to be available under Tide IX."); Richard J. 1.a7arus, Pursuing "En-
vironmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Raw. 787,
836 (1993) (suggesting that, after Franklin, a damages remedy is now available under Title VI).
44
 Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1031.
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that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal
courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable
cause of action.95 The Court found no intent by Congress to limit the
application of this principle in the case of Title IX. 96 Thus, the Franklin
Court held that money damages were available under Title IX on a
showing of intentional discrimination. 97
In addition to addressing the scope of conduct and remedies
included in Title VI, courts have spoken on the issue of required
burdens of proof." In 1984, in Larry P v. Riles, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff alleging a violation
of the Title VI regulations must initially establish a prima facie case
that the recipient of federal funds is acting in a manner that creates a
discriminatory impact.99 The burden then shifts to the defendant to
establish that its plan is required by educational necessity. 1 °° In Larry
R, a class of black school children challenged the use of certain IQ
tests to place them in special classes for the educable mentally retarded
("E.M.R.").'"' The school children argued that the use of the tests
violated Title VI because it resulted in removal of a disproportionate
number of black children from the regular educational program.'"
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had made a prima facie
showing of discriminatory impact in the use of IQ tests and the defen-
dant had failed to prove that the IQ tests were educationally necessary
for their avowed purpose of predicting mental retardation.'" The court
derived its Title VI "educational necessity" test for the school setting
from the test used in the Title VII employment context. 104 Under Title
VII, a defendant may rebut a prima facie case by showing that the
95 Id. at 1035. It should be noted, however, that in this case the court explicitly found that
equitable remedies were inadequate. Id. at 1038. Thus, the holding in Franklin may not apply
where equitable remedies are adequate. See id,
' Id. at 1036-37. In addition, the Court rejected additional reasons not to apply the tradi-
tional presumption in favor of appropriate relief. Id. at 1037-38.
97 Id. at 1038.
98 See supra notes 67-96 and accompanying text; Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ.,
997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1993); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
" 793 F.2d at 982.
199 Id. at 982 & n.9; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 965.
1°1 Larry f!, 793 F.2d at 973,983.
. 192 Id. The Larry P. court generalized from "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question" in the Title VII employment context to educational necessity in the employment
context; the same logic leads to a test of necessity, or a "manifest relationship" to health care
objectives in the health care context. Id. at 982 n.9; Latimore v. County of Contra Costa, No.
C 94-1257, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1994); see infra notes 233-68 and accompanying text
(discussing Latirnore).
103 Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982-83.
104 Id. at 982 n.9.
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employment regulation has a "manifest relationship" to the employ-
ment in question." Thus, in Larry P the Ninth Circuit adopted a
burden-shifting model, requiring that once a plaintiff has made a
prima facie showing that an action creates a discriminatory impact, the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action is mani-
festly related to a legitimate goal. 106
In 1993, in Elston v. Talladega County Board of Education, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a
school district had demonstrated a substantial legitimate justification
for its decision to build a new elementary school in a particular loca-
tion." The court further held that this justification was sufficient to
rebut a prima facie showing that the siting resulted in disparate adverse
impact on minority students." The plaintiffs, representing a class of
black children and their parents, challenged the siting of an elemen-
tary school carried out by defendant public schools, who had a history
of segregation but had since been declared "unitary.""
The Elston court also laid out the structure of a Title VI disparate
impact challenge."' The court concluded that the plaintiff first must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral
practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on a group protected
by Title VI."' The court noted that, by definition, the plaintiffs duty
to show that a challenged practice has a disparate impact requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate a causal link between the defendant's chal-
lenged practice and the disproportionate adverse effect identified."'
To avoid liability, the court concluded, the defendant must then prove
1 °5 Id.
1 °6 See id. at 982 & nn.9 & 10; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 965. The court
rejected the defendant's contentions that the E.M.R. classes were actually a benefit for black
children and, even if the impact was adverse, it was not caused by discriminatory criteria. Larry
P., 793 F.2d at 983.
1 °7 See 997 F.2d 1394, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1993).
1 °8 Id.
1 °9 See id. at 1400-01, 1407. The decision also deals with three other claims. Id. at 1413-14
(school board impermissibly failed to agree to send all students graduating from the proposed
new elementary school to the same junior high and high school), 1416 (school board failed to
require white children to attend the school to which they were assigned), 1423 (school board
reassigned students who attended a school which was being closed in a discriminatory fashion).
The analysis the court used on the siting claim, as well as the three additional ones, is similar;
the decision regarding school siting, however, is most analogous to the health care cases discussed
infra. See id.; see also infra notes 170-272 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs also made antidis-
crimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and other
claims under the First Amendment and state law. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1400.
11 ° Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406-07.
111 Id. at 1407.
112 Id.
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that there exists a "substantial legitimate justification" for the chal-
lenged practice.' ' 8 The court further stated that if the defendant meets
this rebuttal burden, the plaintiff will still prevail if he or she is able to
show that a comparably effective alternative practice exists that would
cause less disproportionality, or that the defendant's justification is a
pretext for discrimination." 4 In intentional discrimination cases, in
addition to proof of substantial disparate impact, courts allow circum-
stantial evidence of intent, such as any of the following: a history of
discriminatory official actions; procedural and substantive departures
from the norms generally followed by the decisionmaker; or discrimi-
natory statements in the legislative or administrative history of the
decision." 8 Thus, in Elston, the court described a three-stage structure
for Title VI disparate impact cases.' 18 The court then held that the
defendant had prevailed at the second stage by showing a substantial
legitimate justification for its decision about where to locate a public
school." 7
In sum, Title VI prohibits racial discrimination in the use of
federal funds in a variety of contexts. 18 The regulations promulgated
under Title VI provide the specific provisions for enforcement."' In
addition, the courts have interpreted both Title VI and its regulations,
further defining the scope of legal action.' 2° Commentators consider
Title VI to be a potentially effective tool in combating disparate impact
in the use of federal funds.'" They also note some shortcomings of
Title VI, however, as it has been interpreted in cases dealing specifically
with the location of health care facilities.'"
II. THE HEALTH CARE FACILITY CASES
Title VI does not explicitly make actions relating to health care
facilities any different from other kinds of Title VI actions.'" Gammen-
118 M.
114 Id.
115 Elstan, 997 F.2d at 1406. The use of these types of evidence is derived from the Equal
Protection context. Id.
116 See id. at 1407.
117 See id. at 1413.
118 See supra notes 24-61 and accompanying text.
119 See, supra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
1213 See supra notes 62-116 and accompanying text.
121 Randall, supra note 1, at 192; Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Wing, supra note 18, at 190.
122 See infra notes 123-272 and accompanying text.
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); Wing, supra note 18, at 137. Wing, after analyzing the
legislative history of Title VI, notes that eliminating discrimination in the delivery of health
services was not a primary objective of Title VI or any of the other provisions of the Civil Rights
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tators note that certain facts about health care, however, make it a valid
area for specific focus.' 24 Two early cases resolving private challenges
to the closing or relocation of hospitals ended in judgments for the
defendants.' 25 One recent case in this area yielded the first preliminary
victory for plaintiffs in actions of this kind; 126 another was dismissed
before reaching the merits of the case.' 27 Facts about health care in the
United States illustrate the environment in which hospitals operate and
in which the recent cases were brought. 128
A. The Health Care Industry and Hospital Management
Health care in the United States is a huge industry; health care
spending runs nearly $900 billion annually. 129 Current statistics esti-
mate that Americans spend more than thirteen percent of gross do-
mestic product ("GDP") on health care.' 3° Based on the annual rate of
growth, experts project that health care could increase to twenty per-
cent of GDP by the year 2010.' 3 ' The United States spends more per
capita on health care than any other country in the advanced industrial
world.'"
The federal government has made a significant commitment to
health care spending.'" In 1992, for example, federal and state gov-
Act. Wing, supra note 18, at 152. Wing concludes that the primary focus of the Title VI debate
concerned its use as an administrative tool to deal effectively with the problem of school segre-
gation. Id.
Title VI actions have received attention in other contexts as well. Lazarus, supra note 92, at
834 (environmental inequities); Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly
Funded Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE 14 1577, 1578
(1992) (construction projects); Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 389, 389 (1992) (environmental racism).
124
 See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Randall, supra note 1, at 192; Watson, Reinvigorat-
ing Title VI, supra note 2, at 978; Wing, .supra note 18, at 190; infra notes 125-50 and accompa-
nying text.
125 See NAACP v. Medical Or., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1324 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch, 627
F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1980).
125 See Latimore v. County of Contra Costa, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 32-33 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
I, 1994).
127 Mussington v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 427, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd,
18 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
128 See infra notes 129-68 and accompanying text.
122 See MARC J. ROBERTS, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR 1,1FE: THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS EXPLAINED
110 (1993).
'" See id. at 79.
151 Id. at 80. That projection is based on an annual growth rate of nine percent for the years
1985 through 1991. Id.
' 52 Id. at 78. For example, in 1991, the United States spent $2868 per capita, Canada spent
$1915, Germany $1659 and Japan $1307. Id.
155 Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 973.
May 1996]	 HEALTH CARE FACILITY LOCATION	 533
ernment spent more than $200 billion on Medicaid and Medicare
alone.'" Health care spending is the fastest growing part of the federal
budget.'" Forty percent of all personal health care expenditures come
from government sources; only about one third are paid for by private
insurance."6 In fact, one out of every three dollars spent on health care
in this country is received through a federal subsidy."' Thus, because
the federal government so extensively subsidizes all health care serv-
ices, discrimination in use of federal funds can have a significant
adverse impact on minorities. 188
Some independent requirements impose responsibilities on hos-
pitals for nondiscriminatory care in addition to the Title VI scheme)"
The Hill-Burton Act, enacted in 1946, created a community service
obligation for participating health care facilities."° Congress intended
it to provide federal financing for the construction and expansion of
health care facilities in exchange for which these facilities agreed to
open their doors to all, in perpetuity, without discrimination based on
race, color or participation in the Medicaid program."' Commenta-
tors, however, observe that the obligation has exacted surprisingly little
from hospitals and nursing homes.'"
154 ROBERTS, supra note 129, at 11. In 1991, Medicare had approximately 35 million recipients
and $120 billion in payments; Medicaid had about 25 million enrollees with $100 billion in
payments. Id. at 51. More than 60% of Medicare spending and 25% of Medicaid spending goes
to hospitals. Id. at 51-52.
185
	 id. at 11.
156 M at 40.
157 See Perkins, supra note 2, at 379 & n.87 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (1992) (tbl. 142)). In total, federal funds pay for 41% of
hospital care, 32% of nursing home care and 28% of doctors' fees. Id. (citing BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (tbl, 141), 98 (tbl. 137)).
138
 See. ROBERTS, supra note 129, at 40; Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Watson, Inner City, supra
note 2, at 1667; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 944.
1 " Kenneth R. Wing, The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Health Facilities, 23 B.C.
L. REv. 577, 578, 600 (1982) (requirement that hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds provide
charity care); see also Jane Perkins & Michael Dowell, Tax Exemption for Health Care Facilities:
Charity Care Enters the Picture, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 247, 250-51 (1988) [hereinafter Perkins
& Dowell, Charity Care] (requirement that hospitals receiving tax exempt status provide mean-
ingful amounts of charity care); Jane Perkins & Michael Dowell, Developments Regarding the
Charitable Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 472, 472 (1985) [hereinafter
Perkins & Dowell, Developments] (requirement that hospitals receiving tax exempt status under
26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994) be operated for charitable purposes).
140 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 628 (2d
ed. 1991); Perkins, supra note 2, at 380-81.
141 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a) (1) (1994); Perkins, supra note 2,
at 380-81; see also Wing, supra note 139, at 600.
142 Perkins, supra note 2, at 381; see generally Stan Dorn, et al., Anti-Discrimination Provisions
and Health Care Access: New Slants on Old Approaches, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 439 (Summer
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States also have an interest in the regulation of health care."'
Some states regulate hospitals through a certificate of need program,
which is designed to control construction of new facilities.'" From the
mid-1970s until the early 1980s, state and federal governments control-
led health care costs primarily by restricting the supply of health care
resources. 145 This was accomplished in large part through certificate of
need programs that required hospitals to obtain government approval
for capital investments. 146 In 1986, the federal government repealed its
most important certificate of need program. 147 Approximately two-
thirds of states have maintained some version of certificate of need
programs. 148
In addition to direct subsidies in the form of Medicare and Medi-
caid payments, tax-free status is another benefit conferred to many
hospitals. 149 One justification for this practice is that nonprofit hospitals
are supposed to provide free care for those unable to pay)" Today,
however, many for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are run in an identi-
cal fashionP Some commentators suggest that those who retain tax-
free status be required to contribute more directly to the communities
in which they are located.'"
Today, almost all hospitals and nursing homes accept federal
funds.'" Therefore, they all come within the reach of Title VI's non-
discrimination requirement.' 54 Despite the pervasiveness of federal
subsidies of health care, however, health outcomes are not equal for
minority and nonminority groups.'"
1986). Administrative complaints and litigation can be used to enforce community service viola-
tions. See Perkins, supra note 2, at 381.
143 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 140, at 684; Perkins & Dowell, Charity Care, supra note
139, at 247; Perkins & Dowell, Developments, supra note 139, at 476.
144
 FURROW ET AL., supra note 140, at 682.
145 Id.
146 id.
147 Id. at 684. That program was the National Health Resource Planning and Development
Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-641. Id.
148 m.
149 Perkins & Dowell, Developments, supra note 139, at 472.
iso
151
 Perkins & Dowell, Charity Care, supra note 139, at 247.
152 Id. at 250-51; Perkins & Dowell, Developments, supra note 139, at 478; see also Nina J.
Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures;
A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 103-10 (1995).
153 See Watson, Reinvigorating Tide VI, supra note 2, at 944. More than 6800 hospitals and
13,700 outpatient and primary care facilities receive federal financial assistance, primarily in the
form of Medicaid and Medicare. Id. at 944 n.31.
154 Id. at 944.
155 See Perkins, supra note 2, at 379; infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
May 1996]	 HEALTH CARE FACILITY LOCATION 	 535
B. Evidence of Unequal Health Outcomes for Minority Groups
Despite the extensive use of federal funds and the antidiscrimina-
tion directive of Title VI, health care outcomes among racial groups
are not equal. 15" Minorities, particularly poor, inner-city African Ameri-
cans, have greater health care needs than whites.m Across a wide
variety of measures, minority groups have poorer health outcomes than
whites.' 68 For example, Hispanics, who account for only 9% of the
population, comprise 16.7% of AIDS cases 1 " and are 4.3 times as likely
as non-Hispanic whites to contract tuberculosis,'" while Hispanic pre-
school children are seven times more likely than non-Hispanic white
preschool children to contract measles. 16 ' In addition, African Ameri-
cans, who account for 11.8% of the United States population, comprise
29.7% of AIDS cases.' 62 People of color also suffer from generally
higher rates of cancer, hypertension, alcohol and drug abuse, cardio-
vascular disease and diabetes.'"
The most objective measure of health is the death rate.'" African
Americans have a rate of death more than fifty percent in excess of the
death rate among European-Americans.'" That translates into 60,000
excess deaths per year, compared to mortality rates of European-Ameri-
cans.' 66 Infant mortalities, or deaths during the first year of life, are
108% higher among African-American infants.' 67 Commentators note
156 See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
157 See Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1648.
159 See Randall, supra note I, at 131-43 (noting that African-Americans experience more
illness than European-Americans and die at a significantly higher rate).
l59 Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1649 n.16 (citing NATIONAL COMM O N ON AIDS, THE
CHALLENGE OF HIV/AIDS IN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3-11(1992)).
1611 Metzger, supra note 2, at 32 (citing Ciro V. Sumaya, Major Infectious Diseases Causing Excess
Morbidity in the Hispanic Population, in HEALTH POLICY AND Tin: HISPANIC 76, 81 (Antonio
Furino ed., 1992)).
161 Metzger, supra note 2, at 32 (citing NAT). COALITION OF HISPANIC HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. ORG ., THE STATE OF HISPANIC HEAUFII: 1992 EDITION 33 (1992) (Data are for 1989 from
35 reporting states and the District of Columbia. Measles cases per 100,000 population: Hispanic,
164.3; black, 86.6; white, 22.5.) ).
162 Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1649 n.16.
163 Trubek & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 1091-92.
164 Randall, supra note 1, at 140.
165 1d. at 141. The rate of excess deaths is calculated by taking the number of actual deaths
observed in the minority population prior to age 70 and subtracting the number of deaths that
would be predicted given the death rate of European-Americans. See id. The reported figures
were a 53.12% excess death rate for African-American women and 52.67% rate for African-Ameri-
can men, Id.
166 1d. at 142.
167 1d. at 142-43.
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that it is undeniable that health outcomes differ across racial groups.' 68
Title VI regulations, by forbidding disparate impact, have the potential
to narrow that gap; past plaintiffs have brought actions in an attempt
to do so.' 69
C. Pre-Guardians Hospital Cases
Two cases prior to Guardians dealt with the issue of Title VI
challenges to health care facilities.'" In both cases, the plaintiffs failed
in their claims despite evidence that the decision regarding the loca-
tion of a health care facility had a disparate impact on them. 17' The
cases illustrate the difficulties early plaintiffs had in Title VI health care
actions."'
For example, in 1980, in Bryan v. Koch, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs in a class
action suit opposing the closing of a city hospital on the grounds that
it would violate Title VI were not entitled to a preliminary injunction
because there was no likelihood of prevailing on the merits."' In Bryan,
168 See id. at 131; see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 31; Perkins, supra note 2, at 377.
165 Set' Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Randall, supra note 1, at 192; Wing, supra note 18, at
190; infra notes 170-277 and accompanying text.
I" See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1324 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch, 627
F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1980). For some law journal articles discussing Title VI health care
challenges prior to Guardians, see generally Norwich, supra note 4; Carol A. Cimkowski, Note,
Municipal Hospital Closings Under Title VI: A Requirement of Reasonable Justifications, 9 FORT/HAM
URB. L.J. 943 (1981); John C. McBride, Note, Title. VI: The Impact/Intent Debate Enters the
Municipal Services Arena, 55 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 124 (1980); Valerie A. Selling, Note, The Prima
Facie Case and Remedies in Title VI Hospital Relocation Cases, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 689 (1980); Zall,
supra note 9.
171 Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1324, 1326-28; Bryan, 627 F.2d at 616, 621. The court in Medical
Center assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs had made a prima fade showing of disparate
impact. 657 F.2d at 1324.
112 See Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1324; Bryan, 627 F.2d at 621.
173 627 F.2d at 612-14. In denying the injunction, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of
the trial court. Id. at 614. The opinion actually covers three related cases opposing the closing
of the hospital: Bryan v. Koch, District Council 37 v. Koch, and Boyd v. Harris. Id. All three cases
contained similar charges and the trial court denied the injunction for all three cases in the same
opinion, 492 F, Stipp. 212. Id. at 614-15.
Bryan v. Koch, the first case, is typical of all three. See id. The plaintiff class consisted of low
income African-American and Hispanic residents of New York City who use the municipal hospital
system. Id. at 614. Defendants were the City and State of New York, the City's Health and Hospital
Corporation ("HHC"), the State Health Department, and various City and State officials including
Mayor Koch. Id. The United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") (for-
merly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) was joined as a defendant but not
charged with any violation of the law. Id. The federal government's initial position supported
granting the prelitninary injunction because it agreed with the Title VI allegations and a conten-
tion made in the Boyd suit that the closing should be deferred until completion of HHS's Title
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a task force appointed by Mayor Koch recommended that New York
close Sydenham, a hospital in the New York City municipal system, due
to budget problems.'" Sydenham was located in central Harlem and
served a ninety-eight percent minority population. 17' The trial court
denied the injunction, finding that there was no evidence that the
City's decision to close Sydenham was racially motivated, that the
evidence adequately established the City's justification for closing Sy-
denham, and that the availability of adequate alternate treatment for
"most, if not all" of the persons served by Sydenham eliminated the
element of irreparable harm necessary for a preliminary injunction to
be granted.'"
In evaluating the plaintiffs' appeal, the Second Circuit used a
stricter standard for review of the denial of a preliminary injunction,
in place of the traditional "abuse of discretion" standard, for two
reasons: because the trial court's hearing resolved with virtual finality
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, and because the hospital closing
was a significant event, unlikely to be altered once taken.'" Ultimately,
however, the court found that the City had sufficiently justified its
decision to close Sydenham and upheld the lower court's denial of the
injunction.' 78
VI investigation. Id. Both District Council 37 v. Koch and Boyd v. Harris were brought by similar
plaintiff classes against the same or similar defendants. Id. at 614-15.
174 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614. The task force plan estimated that $30 million could he saved in
fiscal 1981 by replacing some hospitals, reducing the number of beds in some, and closing two
of the City's 17 municipal hospitals. Id. The City planned to have Sydenham's patients served in
other hospitals. Id. at 617.
1 71.' Id. at 614.
176 7d. at 615. The trial court stated that Title VI, like the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, condemns only conduct motivated by a "racially discriminatory pur-
pose." Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240 (1976)). The court further found that
even if a disparate impact theory was sufficient to constitute a prima facie Title 1/1 violation, the
City's justification of necessity was an adequate defense. Id.
177 Id. at 616. Although the court stated its inclination to examine the injunction denial
"somewhat more rigorously" than the usual abuse of discretion standard, it did not make explicit
exactly what level of scrutiny it applied, See id. at 616-19. After discussing the standard for
evaluation of the denial of the preliminary injunction, the court also discussed the appropriate
standard under which to evaluate the plaintiffs' substantive claims, discriminatory intent or
disparate impact. See id. at 616. The court, however, reached no conclusion on this issue. Id.
178 Id. at 621. The City justified its choice to close Sydenham and another hospital from
among the City's 17 hospitals by measuring it against a set of four criteria: (a) hospital size, scope
of patient services and extent of usage; (b) patient access to comparable alternative facilities; (c)
quality of plant and operations; and (d) present and predicted fiscal performance. Id. at 618.
Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that given the disparate racial impact of the hospital's closing, it
was defendants' duty to show that there were no available measures that would save equivalent
money with less disproportionate impact. Id. They claimed that the city could save as much or
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The Second Circuit found that neither Title VI nor the HHS
regulations explicitly require a recipient of federal funds to consider
alternatives to a proposed placement or closing of a public facility.'"
The court noted that under Title VI, inquiry into alternatives could
frequently become too open-ended.)"° The court looked to Title VII
for guidance as to the appropriate standard for Title VI challenges.' 81
The court concluded that a wide-ranging consideration of alternatives
was unnecessary in this case and that the City had sufficiently justified
the appropriateness of its choice.'" Given the decision to close a hos-
pital, the court ruled that the proper consideration in this case was
which of the municipal hospitals were appropriate for closing, not
whether some alternative to closing a hospital might be better.'" Thus,
more without disparate racial impact by hospital mergers, regionalization of services, increasing
Sydenham's services to reduce its deficit or increasing Medicaid reimbursement. Id.
179
 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 618. The court noted, however, that MIS had stated its belief that its
regulations should be interpreted to require the consideration of alternatives. Id.
18°1d. at 619. "The alternatives plaintiffs wish to have considered are more appropriate for
examination by administrative, legislative, and other political processes than by the courts." Id.
IHI Id. In doing so it determined that an open-ended consideration of alternatives frequently
might result in the court's substituting its judgment for that of the city's elected officials and
appointed specialists. Id. The court noted that, on one hand, Title VII inquiries into alternatives
are usually sharply focused on particular selection devices which, though facially neutral, have a
disparate racial impact in selecting qualified employees. See id. The court expressed its concern
that Title VI discussions of alternatives, in contrast, could easily become as large in scope as
finding other ways in the administration of a city to save money. See id. The court was also
concerned that such policy choices would be made without broad public participation and might
not have the desired effect of benefiting the minority population. Id. Thus, the court chose a
narrow alternatives analysis analogous to that used under Title VII. Id.
At least one commentator has argued that there are good reasons to analyze Tide VI and
Title VII actions differently. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VT, supra note 2, at 971-75. Watson
argues that Congress enacted Tide Vil under the Commerce Clause to regulate private employ-
ment relationships against a common-law tradition of employment-at-will. Id. at 971-72. Because
of this, Title VII incorporates provisions designed to ensure that it does not lead to undue
governmental interference with private business. Id. In contrast, Congress enacted Title VI under
the Spending Power, giving it more leverage to attach conditions to the use of federal funds. See
id. at 972-73.
182 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 619. Following that discussion, the court then discussed the standards
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction while an administrative determination on the merits
of the action was still pending. Id. at 620. Here the court failed to find an analogy to Title VII
persuasive because Title VI plaintiff's are not required to pursue administrative inquiry before
beginning a civil suit. Id. Under Title VII, plaintiffs in appropriate circumstances are granted a
preliminary injunction pending investigation of discrimination charges by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") in order to maintain the status quo. Id. The court's
reasoning was that Title VII plaintiffs are required to present their claim before the EEOC before
proceeding with a civil action. Id. Because Title V1 has no similar requirement, the court felt that
there was no need to preserve the status quo through a preliminary injunction. See id.
183 See id. at 619. The court did not consider alternatives to the closing that might have a less
discriminatory impact, but accepted the proposition that "if any municipal hospitals are to be
closed, plaintiffs do not dispute that Sydenham is an appropriate choice for closing." See id. at
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the court held that the plaintiffs' showing did not entitle them to a
preliminary injunction because the City had been forced into and
made a difficult choice while planning in good faith for the hospital
needs of those patients who were using Sydenham.' 84
Judge Kearse concurred in the court's opinion in part and dis-
sented in part; he would have granted the injunction.'" Judge Kearse
noted that the City should be required, at minimum, to demonstrate
that its decision was the product of a rational decision-making process,
which he felt it had failed to do.'"' Judge Kearse reasoned that requir-
ing a rational decision-making process would ensure not only that a
defendant had substantive goals in mind, but also that the defendant's
decision actually advanced the goals with some sense of the relative
effectiveness of other courses of action.' 81 Judge Kearse proposed a
two-phase evaluation for determining the adequacy of the City's justi-
fication: the court would first examine the process by which the decision
was reached and then inquire into the substantive merits of the deci-
sion.' 88 Judge Kearse concluded that the City failed to show that its
decision had a rational basis and thus found it unnecessary to consider
the substance of that decision. 189 For that reason, Judge Kearse con-
cluded that the majority should have granted the preliminary injunc-
tion.' 9° In addition, Judge Kearse defended the disparate impact stand-
ard as appropriate for Title VI cases, finding support for it in precedent
as well as the legislative history and the administrative regulations
enforcing Title VI. 19 ' The majority in Bryan, however, denied a prelimi-
nary injunction against the closing of a city hospital because it found
618-19. Thus plaintiffs' contentions that the City might save equivalent money by hospital
mergers, regionalization of services, increasing Sydenham's services to reduce its deficit, or
increasing Medicaid reimbursement, were not within the scope of the analysis. Id.
184 Id. at 620.
185 1d. at 621 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He concurred because he
agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of disparate impact.
Id. He dissented because he did not agree that the City adequately justified its decision to close
the hospital. Id.
188 1d. (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Under this view, a rational deci-
sion-making process must include consideration of appropriate alternatives and a factual assess-
ment of the effect of the alternatives. Id. at 623. Only where a defendant has shown that a rational
basis for its decision existed would a court move on to evaluate the substantive merit of the
decision. Id.
1 " See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 623 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
IBB Id. (Kearse, j., concurring in part, dissenting in part). judge Kearse described this inquiry
as limited enough to ensure that the court would not have to evaluate alternatives whose merits
had not been adequately developed in the record. Id.
189 Id. at 624 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
. 19°1d. at 628 (Kearse, j., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
191 See id. at 621-22 (Kearse, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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there was no likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits
of their civil rights case.'"
In 1981, in NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that although disparate impacts
of a neutral policy may be adequate to establish discrimination under
Title VI, in this case the defendant medical center had produced
adequate evidence to justify its relocation and reorganization plan.'"
Plaintiffs in the class action, representing minorities, handicapped and
elderly persons, alleged that the relocation plan had a discriminatory
impact on them.' 94
 Defendant, Wilmington Medical Center ("WMC"),
asserted that the relocation and reorganization plan were necessary
due to changed circumstances.' 95
 After studying about fifty plans for
relocation and consolidation, the WMC board decided on Plan
Omega. 196
 The WMC board designed the plan to reduce the number
of beds in downtown Wilmington and build a new 780-bed facility in
the southwestern suburbs.'" Plaintiffs opposed the plan, contending
that the relocation would subject members of the class to inferior
192 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614.
199
 657 F.2d 1322, 1324 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane). The complete procedural history of the
case is complex, in part because the case was in litigation for five years. Id. The City of Wilmington
was added as a plaintiff at the trial level, and an action under the Age Discrimination Act was
amended to the complaint. Id. The plaintiff's appeal was heard initially by a panel and then
reheard by the court en bane. Id.
For another discussion of the case, see Dennis R. Bartholomew, Recent Case, 27 Vim. L. Rev.
797 (1981-82).
194 See Medical Cir, 657 F.2d at 1324. Plaintiffs brought actions not only under Tide VI, but
also under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Age Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6101-07. Id. at 1324. This discussion will focus on the Tide VI claims. The court found
the analysis for all three issues similar, at least in regard to the impact test, because the Rehabili-
tation Act and Age Discrimination Act were both patterned after Tide VI. Id. at 1331.
195 See id. at 1325. Wilmington Medical Center ("WMC") was organized in 1965 by the merger
of three hospitals and provided most of the nonprofit acute general hospital beds in New Castle
County. Id. at 1324, Services were concentrated in Wilmington itself while the southwestern part
of the county surrounding Newark, Delaware, was underserved. Id. WMC was struggling both
with its physical plant and its budget. Id. at 1325. This, combined with both a population shift
away from Wilmington to the southwestern suburbs and the possibility of a competing health
care institution opening in that area, convinced WMC of the need for remedial action. Id. at
1325. In addition to WMC, defendants included the City of Wilmington and the Secretary of
HEW. Id. at 1322.
196 1d. at 1325.
197 1d. After the district court ordered a review, HEW found discriminatory effects in the plan.
Id. WMC then contracted to make modifications to ensure that Plan Omega would comply with
Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act_ Id. The modifications included providing shuttle bus service
between the two facilities because no public transportation was available, renovating the urban
plant, devising inpatient service plans for the two branches to prevent racial identifiability at
either location, and operating the two facilities on a unitary basis. Id. HEW then withdrew its
objections to Omega. Id.
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health care and disproportionate travel burdens and alleging that
WMC misallocated services between the two divisions.' The district
court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.'"
The Third Circuit addressed several legal issues in the plaintiffs'
appeal:2m The court first ruled that a showing of disparate impact, even
absent a showing of intentional discrimination, was enough to establish
a claim under Title VI. 2"' The court assumed, without deciding, that
the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of disparate impact. 202
In deciding which standard is appropriate after the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie case, the court looked to the reasoning in Title VII
intentional discrimination cases that require that the ultimate burden
of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff. 2°3 The circuit court
agreed with the district court that the defendant had met the necessary
burden and shown that its actions were appropriate because they
served a legitimate goal. 204 The circuit court also agreed that none of
the six alternative plans would serve WMC's needs. 2" For this reason
the circuit court, like the district court, denied the plaintiffs' claims. 206
Thus, the Medical Center court held that the defendant had adequately
rebutted the plaintiffs' prima facie case by showing that Plan Omega
served a legitimate interest. 207
Judge Adams concurred in the court's result but decided to write
separately because of the different approach he used to reach his
1118 /d. at 1326.
199 Medical Ctr, 657 F.2d at 1324. The district court found no evidence of discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 1326. It also found that the plaintiffs had failed to present a prima fade case. Id.
at 1326. In addition, the court noted that even if a showing of disparate impact had been made,
the defendant had successfully rebutted the plaintiffs' contentions by demonstrating a bona fide
need that could not be satisfied by any less discriminatory plan. Id. at 1326. Finally, the court
found that the plaintiffs did not prove that any feasible alternative to Plan Omega was available.
Id. at 1326.
200 Id. at 1328.
2° 1 Id. In doing so, the court distinguished Bakke from Lau, as did Guardians a few years
later. See id. at 1329-31; supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. The court did not make the
distinction, which arose in Guardians, between the Title VI regulations and Title VI itself. See
Medical an, 657 F.2d at 1329-31.
2°2 Medical Ctr, 657 F.2d at 1324.
2°9
	 at 1333-37. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that there should be a different
burden on the defendant when the charge is disparate impact as opposed to discriminatory
intent. Id. at 1333. For a discussion of why such heavy reliance on Title VII for determining the
standards in a Title VI case is inappropriate, see Watson, Reinvigorating Tide VI, supra note 2, at
971-75, and discussion supra note 177.
204 Medical an, 657 F.2d at 1337.
2051d.
206 See id. at 1338,
207 Id. at 1336-37.
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result 208
 Judge Adams failed to find that the plaintiffs established a
prima facie case and would have upheld the district court's judgment
on that ground. 209 In contrast, Judge Gibbons dissented from the judg-
ment because he concluded that the plaintiffs had shown a definite
and measurable disparate impact."' He also disagreed with the major-
ity's analogy between the defendant's burden in intentional discrimi-
nation cases and the burden used in disparate impact discrimination
cases because the former places too great a burden on plaintiffs and
thwarts the congressional intent behind Title VI. 2" A majority of the
Third Circuit in Medical Centerheld, however, that even if plaintiffs had
established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant had
produced adequate evidence to justify its relocation and reorganiza-
tion plan. 212 Thus, despite findings of potential disparate impact, nei-
ther of the two hospital siting cases prior to Guardians resulted in
liability for the defendants. 218
D. Mussington and Latimore: Two Recent Title VI Challenges
Two recent cases, one in which the plaintiffs were successful and
one in which they were not, illustrate developments in the law since
Guardians and highlight difficulties that remain for plaintiffs:214 In
Mussington v. St. Luke's -Roosevelt Hospital Center, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a corn-
2°8 Id. at 1338 (Adams, J., concurring).
2°9 Medical Cie, 657 F.2d at 1338, 1340 (Adams, J., concurring).
21° Id. at 1340 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Gibbons agreed
that Title VI prohibits disparate impact as well as intentional discrimination. Id. at 1340. He also
agreed that plaintiffs had not established a prima facie violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at
1340. Judge Gibbons found, however, that the district court made "several fundamental legal
errors, which the majority opinion ignores" in finding that the plaintiffs had failed to make out
a prima facie case under Title VI. Id. at 1341. In analyzing the evidence under three categories:
accessibility, quality of care and racial identifiability, the dissent found evidence, disregarded by
the trial court, sufficient to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VI. See
id. at 1344-49. Judge Gibbons felt that the errors made in the trial court required a reversal and
remand. Id. at 1352.
211 See id. at 1352 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent argued
that this holding "achieves an artificial symmetry, but at considerable cost to the prospects of
eliminating all forms of discrimination which, as the opinion of the court confirms, was the im-
petus behind Title VI." Id. at 1352. Judge Gibbons reasoned that the nature of the action, where
plaintiffs seek not to punish a wrongdoer but to correct for inadvertence, and the respective
position of the parties justifies a heavier burden on defendants; he argued that the burden should
be on the defendants to demonstrate the necessity of their plan. See id. at 1353-55 & n.25.
212 1d at 1324.
213 See id. at 1324; Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 1980).
214 See Latimore v. County of Contra Costa, No. C 94-1257, slip op. (N.D. Cal, Aug. 1 1994);
Mussington v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Flosp. Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 18 F.3d
1033 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
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plaint alleging violations of Title VI on the grounds that it was time-
barred. 215 Defendant St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center ("SLRHC")
was a hospital composed of two separate facilities: St. Luke's and
Roosevelt. 2" As a result of financial difficulties, the two merged in
1979.2 ' 7 As a result of further financial difficulties, SLRHC planned a
number of long-range changes including consolidation of particular
services at one or the other of the facilities. 218 The plaintiffs, both
individuals and organizations, alleged that the shifting of services to
the Roosevelt site would discriminate against Medicaid beneficiaries
and minorities. 219 They sought declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief. 220
The defendants moved to dismiss various parts of the complaint
on several grounds: the claims lacked ripeness, they lacked standing,
they were barred by the statute of limitations, they were barred by
laches, and the complaint failed to allege the elements of the causes
of action.22 ' The individual plaintiffs were granted standing by the
court because they had alleged a sufficient threat of injury.222 All the
organizational plaintiffs, however, were denied standing on various
grounds. 225 On the grounds of the statute of limitations and laches, the
court ruled that the plaintiffs' claims were barred. 224 The court found
218 See 824 F. Supp. at 433, 434. The plaintiffs also made allegations under § 1983, the
Hill-Burton Act, and Title II as well as analogous violations of state law. Id. at 429-30, These claims
were all dismissed for various reasons, none of which reached the merits of the case. See id. at 434.
215 /d, at 429.
2171d.
218 Id. at 429. The defendant's plan included the consolidation of obstetric services ("OB"),
previously located at both facilities, at Roosevelt. Id. The neonatal intensive care unit ("NICU")
and pediatric inpatient care services were similarly to be consolidated at Roosevelt. Id. Finally,
the number of general beds at St. Luke's was scheduled to be reduced by 212. Id, at 429, 430.
218 Id. at 429. The plaintiffs consisted of low-income minority individuals, churches, and other
organizations all located or living in the vicinity of St. Luke's. Id.
2" Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 429.
221 Id. at 430. The court found the case ripe as to the pediatrics, OB and NICU allegations.
Id. The plan to reduce the number of general beds had been deferred until at least 1995, did
not constitute a current controversy, and thus was deemed by the court not to be ripe. Id.
222 Id. at 431. Defendants claimed that because none of the plaintiffs had alleged a significant
likelihood of need for OB, NICU or pediatric services in the near future, the requirement of
personal injury or threat of injury necessary for standing had not been met. Id. at 430. The court
did not accept this contention, finding that a reduction in health resources available to the
plaintiffs constituted a threat of injury. Id. at 431.
225 1d. at 431-32. The three church plaintiffs were denied standing because the interests
sought to be protected were not sufficiently germane to their purpose. Id. at 431. Two of the
organization plaintiffs had purposes too broad to confer standing. /d, The last organization
plaintiff failed to claim that it had members threatened with injury such as to confer standing.
Id. at 431-32.
224 See id. at 433-34. The court applied the statute of limitations analysis to the plaintiffs'
Title VI and § 1983 claims, Id. at 433. It applied the laches analysis to the claims for equitable
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that, as to the three-year statute of limitations, the statute began to run
when the opposed plan gained a significant degree of certainty."'
The court did not accept the plaintiffs' argument that the "con-
tinuing violation" exception was applicable because the alleged dis-
crimination and the receipt of federal funds was ongoing . 226 According
to the court, to benefit from the continuing violation doctrine the
plaintiffs would have to show either a sequence of related discrimina-
tory acts, at least one of which occurred during the limitations period,
or a discriminatory system maintained during that period. 227 The court
found, however, that the discriminatory act "central to the plaintiffs'
claims" was the decision to relocate services, not the effects caused by
that decision.228 Thus, the violation could not be considered "continu-
ing," and the statute of limitations barred the action. 229
The court further concluded that laches similarly barred the plain-
tiffs from making claims that sought equitable remedies. 23° To success-
fully argue laches, the court held, the defendant must show both a lack
of diligence by the plaintiff in failing to come forward earlier and
prejudice to itself. 23 ' The plaintiffs argued that their vehement oppo-
sition to this plan in the public arena constituted reasonable dili-
gence.232 The court reasoned, however, that the plaintiffs' failure to
take legal action prior to the filing of this suit meant that they had not
adequately asserted their rights."' The court also found that, because
relief. Id. at 433. The court did nut explicitly address the issue of whether equitable relief was
claimed by or might be available under Title VI. See id. at 432-34.
225 See Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 433. In determining whether the challenged plan had
reached a significant degree of certainty, the court examined the circumstances around the plan's
development, adoption and approval. Id. at 432-33.
226 See id. at 432-33.
227 See id. at 433. The plaintiffs claimed that the violation continued as long as the hospital
was receiving federal funds and planning to reduce services in a manner that created a discrimi-
natory impact. Id. Alternatively, they claimed that as long as the Department of Health ("DOH")
retained continued jurisdiction over the plan the statute of limitations period would not begin
to expire. Id. The court found these contentions insufficient to alter the fact that the act central
to the plaintiffs' claims was the decision to reduce services and the DOH approval of that plan.
Id. Thus, the court rejected the contention that either the hospital, DOH or both had engaged
in a sequence of discriminatory acts, without addressing the possibility that a hospital offering
services in a way that produced a discriminatory effect could be considered a discriminatory
system. See id,
228 1d, at 433. The court did not articulate a rationale or provide a source for its apparent
"central to the claims" test. See id. at 933. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Mussingion court's use of the continuing violation doctrine.
225 1d.
2" See Mussingion, 829 F. Supp. at 433-34.
291  Id. at 433.
232 Id. at 434.
233 See id.
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construction had nearly been completed and the changes demanded
by the plaintiff would impose costs in the millions of dollars, allowing
the claims would prejudice the defendant."' Thus, in Mussington the
court held that the plaintiffs' discrimination claim must be dismissed
before even reaching the merits."' Mussington illustrates some of the
many obstacles that plaintiffs face in a Title VI action; in a more recent
case, however, the plaintiffs had some success. 2g6
In 1994, in Latimore v. County of Contra Costa, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California granted a prelimi-
nary injunction blocking the construction of a new hospital."7 The
plaintiffs alleged that the challenged plan would have a disparate
impact on minority members of Contra Costa County, California."'
The court granted the injunction, reasoning that the County's entire
system of health care delivery had a discriminatory impact on minority
residents of the County and that the contested plan would perpetuate
that discrimination. 239 Thus, in Latimore the court held that plaintiffs
were entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent construction of a
hospital with an alleged disparate impact."'
The controversy surrounded the proposed closing of Merrithew
Hospital, a 179-bed acute-care facility in Central County, then in a state
of disrepair, and the construction of a smaller 144-bed hospital on the
same site. 24' The individual and organizational plaintiffs in this class
action represented a group of indigent minority individuals and com-
munity churches located in the East and West County of Contra Costa
234 See id. at 434.
Mussington, 824 F. Supp, at 434.
236 See supra notes 211-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 237-71 and accompanying
text.
237 No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 32-33 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1994).
235 Id. at 1-3.
2" Id. at 29,32-33. The court's order also denies the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at
2. Since the initial grant of a preliminary injunction, the court has ostensibly lifted the injunction
due to changes in the policies of the county, but has yet to produce a written order. Telephone
Interview with Bill Lee, attorney for the plaintiffs (Jan. 25, 1995).
24° Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 32-33.
241 Id. at 3. Merrithew was built more than 110 years ago, and the demographics of the county
have shifted significantly since that time. Id. at 11 n.10. Though the original siting of the hospital
may have been appropriate and nondiscriminatory at that time, the plaintiffs contend that it now
insufficiently serves the minority population. Id. at 3,11 n.10.
The plaintiffs' claim is that not only the new hospital, but also the overall plan for the delivery
of services will disproportionately underservice, and thus discriminate against, the County's
minority population. Id. at 8, The fact that plaintiffs challenge a system of discrimination is
important to their use of the continuing violation doctrine. Id. at 8-9. See infra notes 285-90
and accompanying text for a discussion of the continuing violation doctrine and its effect on the
statute of limitations.
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County, California. 242
 The defendants included Contra Costa County,
the Health Services Department of Contra Costa County, and the
California Department of Health Services. 245
 Defendants proposed a
replacement hospital that would be funded by a bond issue. 244
 Plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants denied them access to County hospital
services equal to that afforded to the primarily caucasian Central
County residents. 245
On April 13, 1993, plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint with
the OCR alleging disparate impact on racial minorities in violation of
Title VI regulations.24S While that action was still pending, they filed
for the preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California. 247
 On April 25, 1994, the OCR
issued an opinion concluding that the County had complied with Title
VI.248
 The plaintiffs continued their private action, alleging various civil
rights violations. 249
 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the beginning of construction on the new hospital until an
acceptable alternative proposal could be adopted, while the defen-
dants moved to dismiss the complaint. 250
242 Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 1. Contra Costa County is divided into four regions:
the West County, East County, Central County and South County. Id. at 2-3.
243
 kl. at 2.
244
 Id. at 3.
245 /d. The plaintiffs claim that Merrithew is inaccessible due to its location and a lack of
adequate public transportation. Id. at 3 & n.4. They claim that the County's ethnic minority and
indigent population are concentrated primarily in East and West County, while only a fraction of
the County's MediCal-eligible residents live in Central County, and a majority of the Central
County poor are white. Id. at 4.
246 /d. at 4.
247 See Lattimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 4.
246 Id. OCR's conclusions stated that "the county is in compliance with Title VI with respect
to the location of its public hospital." Id. Defendants relied heavily on the administrative findings
as a defense of their proposed action. See id. at 22.
249 /d. at 5. The plaintiffs' complaint alleges claims under: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the regulations promulgated thereunder; (2) the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (guaranteeing rights of minorities to contract); and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution (Equal Protection) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Because the court
found the Title Vi claims a sufficient basis for granting the injunction, it did not reach the merits
of the § 1981 and § 1983 claims. Id. at 27 n.21.
Plaintiffs also moved for, but were denied, a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). Id. at 5.
Because the Complaint was filed on April 14, 1994, and construction on the hospital was not
scheduled to begin until August 1994, the court found a lack of sufficient urgency to grant the
TRO. Id. at 4. On June 7, 1994, the court heard oral argument on the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and the defendants' 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 5-6.
234) See id. at 6.
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On August 1, 1994, the district court ruled on both motions."'
The court first denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. 252
 The de-
fendants unsuccessfully argued that the plaintiffs' claims were time-
barred.253 The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs were challeng-
ing the County's failure to provide equal access to hospital services,
the plaintiffs' claims were timely under the continuing violation doc-
trine, which necessitates a showing only that a discriminatory system
or policy operated at least in part within the limitations period. 254 The
defendants also challenged the standing of the plaintiffs to bring this
action. 255 The court concluded that the individual plaintiffs all had
alleged sufficient injury in the denial of equal opportunity to obtain a
state benefit to confer standing. 256 For these reasons the court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss."'
The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.258
 The injunction restrained the defendants from further
construction and expenditure of construction or preconstruction
funds until equal access to county hospital services was made available
to the plaintiff class or the resolution of trial. 259
 The court reasoned
2" See id. at 1, 32-33.
252 See Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 32. The motion was filed pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6); it could only be granted if "it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff 'can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id.
at 6 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
258 Id. at 7-8. The defendants attempted to fix the time that the plaintiffs' claims accrued as
March 3, 1992, the date the County Board approved the new hospital, which would mean that
the one-year statute of limitations would have tolled before the plaintiff's filed their complaint.
Id. The defendants argued that the claim should be barred because more than one year had
passed between the March 3, 1993, approval of the new hospital by the County Board and the
April 14, 1994, filing of the plaintiffs complaint. Id. The court noted that where a federal civil
rights statute does not contain a limitations period, the federal courts look to the forum state's
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Id. at 7 n.6. In this case, the California Code of
Civil Procedure, § 340(3) fixed the statute of limitations for personal injury claims at one year.
Id. However, the court rejected the statute of limitations defense. Id. at 8.
254 Id. at 8-9. The defendants offered several arguments in opposition to the application of
the continuing violations doctrine, all of which the court rejected. Id. at 10-11. First, they asserted
that the doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory impact. Id. at 10. Second, they claimed that improper conduct subsequent to the
Board's approval of the new County hospital was merely a continuing effect of a discriminatory
act. Id. Finally, the County contended that the doctrine does not apply because the decision to
construct the new County hospital at the same site as the old one continued "a facially neutral
system which has existed for 110 years." Id. at 11.
255 Id. at 6; see infra note 256 and accompanying text.
256 /d. at 12-13. The church plaintiffs were deemed not to have individualized standing but
were granted organizational standing. Id. at 14, 17.
257 Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 6-17, 32.
258 Id. at 32.
255 See id. at 32-33.
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that the plaintiffs had met the necessary standard for the granting of
a preliminary injunction by demonstrating the existence of serious
questions going to the merits and showing that the balance of hard-
ships tips sharply in the movant's favor. 260
 Using the framework set
forth in Larry P, the court determined that the plaintiffs had demon-
strated a prima facie case by showing that most of the County's minor-
ity population lived outside of Central County and was disproportion-
ately disadvantaged by the centralization of services. 261
 The court did
not accept the defendants' proffered justification for the plan because
it found that the County's plan to expand contractual arrangements
with district and community hospitals was a "tacit admission" that
decentralized services were necessary, but had not been implemented
to equalize access to hospital services for the County's minority poor. 262
Because the defendants failed to carry their burden of proving neces-
sity, the court did not require the plaintiffs to demonstrate the exist-
ence of other, less discriminatory alternatives. 263
 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of
discriminatory impact and that the defendants had failed to rebut with
a showing of necessity. 264
The court then went on to discuss the balance of hardships. 265 In
doing so, the court found that the balance of hardships in allowing the
construction to move forward would fall squarely on the plaintiffs. 266
According to the court, the plaintiffs suffered significant injury and
risk of injury due to lack of ready access to health care, which would
be exacerbated by the plans to rebuild a new hospital at the same
location.267
 According to the court, the harm to the defendants "pales
by comparison" to the harm faced by the plaintiffs, 268 The court stated
that an injunction served only to delay the construction of the hospital,
not implement the plaintiffs' proposal, and thus would only result in
260 Id. at 31-32. The court noted that these formulations represent two points on a continuum
where the required degree of irreparable harm necessary to secure an injunction increases as
the probability of success decreases. Id. at 17-18. Plaintiffs need not show that they will succeed
on the merits, but must at least show that their cause presents serious questions of law worthy of
litigation with a fair chance of success on the merits. Id. at 18.
261 Id. at 19-20,21-22,25. Plaintiffs also relied on an investigation by the Civil Rights Bureau
of the California Department of Social Services concluding that the centralization of welfare
services in Central County would place a disproportionate burden on minorities. Id. at 22.
262 Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 26-27.
265 Id. at 27.
26a
	 id. at 25,27.
265 See id. at 28.
266 1d. at 30.
267 See Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 28-29.
266 Id. at 30.
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possible financial losses due to a temporary interruption of the con-
struction. 269
Thus, the Latimare court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss
because the plaintiffs were within the statute of limitations and had
standing for their complaint. 270
 The court granted the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction because it found that they had made
out a prima facie case of discriminatory impact that had been in-
sufficiently rebutted by the defendant, giving the plaintiffs a chance of
success on the merits; the court found, in addition, the balance of
harm in the case tipped sharply in favor of the plaintiffs. 27 ' As a result,
in Latimore, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California ordered the cessation of construction on the new hospital
until Title VI claims alleging discriminatory impact of the plan were
resolved. 272
Title VI challenges to the location of health care facilities pre-
sent an application of the general antidiscrimination rules of Title VI
and its implementing regulations. 275 Under the framework set forth in
Larry P, plaintiffs seeking to prevail on violations of the Title VI
regulations must allege, at a minimum, a disparate effect on them in
the provision of health care due to the location of the facility being
challenged. 274 If they are successful, the defendant must show that its
actions were required by necessity, or in other words, had a manifest
relationship to the health care objectives of the defendant. 275 Doing so
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a
less discriminatory option available that is comparably effective. 276 That
general framework holds potential for both the elimination and per-
petuation of facially neutral policies with a disparate impact on minori-
ties as the law of Title VI continues to unfold. 277
260 See id. at SO-31. Though defendants provided estimated losses for the complete termina-
tion of the construction project, which might range into millions of dollars, there were no specific
facts about how much loss would result from a temporary interruption of construction. Id. at 31.
270 See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
27L See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text.
272 see Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 32-33.
27s
	 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981);
13ryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir, 1980); Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op.; Mussington v. St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 18 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994)
(per curiam); 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1994).
274 Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 19-24; Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969,982 & nn.9-10
(9th Cir. 1984).
275 Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 25-27.
276 1d. at 27-28; Elston v, Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394,1407 (11th Cir, 1993).
277
	 Randall, supra note 1, at 192; Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Wing, supra note 18, at
190; infra notes 278-311 and accompanying text.
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III. STRENGTHENING TITLE VI ACTIONS:
LOWERING THE BURDEN ON PLAINTIFFS
To end discriminatory impact in federally funded health care
facilities, as was intended by Congress, courts need to lower the burden
on Title VI plaintiffs. 278
 Doing so is in keeping not only with congres-
sional intent, but also with the equitable nature of Title VI. 279 Allowing
plaintiffs to make use of the continuing violation doctrine to satisfy the
requirement of the statute of limitations is one way to decrease the
burdens on plaintiffs. 280
 Shifting the burden of persuasion relating to
less discriminatory alternatives from plaintiffs to defendants in Title VI
cases will further advance that goa1.28' In addition, to avoid an in-
creased burden on future plaintiffs, the current split between the Title
VI regulations and the Title VI statute itself should be abolished. 282
Doing so would appropriately decrease the burden on Title VI plain-
tiffs, making the action a more powerful tool for ending disparate
impact in health care facilities that receive federal funds.
Commentators note that Title VI has great potential for eliminat-
ing discrimination in the use of federal funds. 2" They also note, how-
ever, that Title VI's potential has not been fully realized. 284 In fact, Title
VI has not erased the substantial gap between the health outcomes of
minority and nonminority groups in this country. 285
 The current heavy
burden on plaintiffs has done little to combat facially neutral policies
with a disparate impact. 286
 Proof of intentional discrimination in the
health care context is likely to be difficult.'" While the overall burden
278 See NAACP v, Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1352 (1981) (Gibbons, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 941, 977. Lowering
the burden on plaintiffs necessarily means raising the burden on Title VI defendants. See Watson,
Reinvigorating 7'ille VI, supra note 2, at 977. That is acceptable because, as Judge Gibbons noted
in Medical Center, a Tide VI action is more in the nature of correcting an inadvertence than
punishing a wrongdoer. 657 F.2d at 1353 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The persistence of discrimination leads to the conclusion that the present burden is too high.
Randall, supra note 1, at 191; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 942.
279 See Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 941, 943-44.
280 See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text_
281 See infra notes 295-304 and accompanying text.
282 See infra notes 305-11 and accompanying text.
283
 Randall, supra note 1, at 185-86, 192; Perkins, supra note 2, at 380; Wing, supra note 18,
at 190.
284 See Randall, supra note 1, at 191; Watson, Inner City, supra note 2, at 1669; Watson,
Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 942.
285 See Randall, supra note 1, at 192; Perkins, supra note 2, at 372-77, 380; Watson, Inner City,
supra note 2, at 1649; Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 942, 973-74.
288 Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 942, 978; see Randall, supra note 1, at 191.
287
 See Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1352-53 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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on plaintiffs should be lowered, in order to justify a substantial reduc-
tion in the burden on the Title VI plaintiff courts should place some
limitations on the action. 288
 The following discussion attempts to strike
a better balance between the goals of the statute and defendants' rights
through three alterations in current Title VI doctrine: allowing plain-
tiffs to benefit from the continuing violation doctrine; removing the
burden for plaintiffs to demonstrate the availability of less discrimina-
tory alternatives to challenged plans; and eliminating the distinction
between the Title VI regulations and Title VI itself.
A. The Continuing Violation Doctrine
Title VI plaintiffs should be allowed to take advantage of the
continuing violation doctrine to more easily satisfy the requirements
of statutes of limitation. The continuing violation doctrine allows plain-
tiffs who can show either a series of related acts, at least one of which
occurs within the period of the statute, or a discriminatory system or
policy that operated at least in part within the limitations period to
satisfy the requirement of this doctrine. 289 Because the continuing
operation of a hospital or other health care facility in a manner that
has a disparate adverse impact constitutes the maintenance of a dis-
criminatory system, courts should find that such activities meet the
requirement of the continuing violation doctrine. 2'" The court in Muss-
ington incorrectly failed to do so, and as a result, the plaintiffs' claim
part). This nay be the result of both a reduction in overt intentional discrimination and the fact
that health care providers who do intentionally discriminate have become wise enough to mini-
mize direct evidence of their intent. See Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 940-41.
288
 Title VI plaintiffs who rely only on a showing of disparate impact should not be allowed
to recover compensatory damages. The harm demonstrated by disparate impact will likely be
difficult to value. The potential for gaining monetary damages might also induce the filing of
some frivolous claims. Limiting recovery to equitable relief helps ensure that only meritorious
suits are brought by removing any personal financial incentive plaintiffs have, Most significantly,
though, enforcing damage awards against recipients of federal funds will only decrease the
resources available for health care services. In extreme cases, it might provoke recipients of
federal funds to elect to cease receiving federal money, resulting in the loss of sorely needed
health care services. Because the goal of Title VI is not to punish but to correct inadvertence,
restricting relief to equitable remedies designed to correct inequities in the delivery of health
care services adequately serves the purposes of the statute, See Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1353
(Gibbons, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Title VI plaintiffs who are able to demonstrate intentional discrimination, however, should
be entitled to greater relief. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 n.27. intentionally racist conduct
justifies compensatory damages, and in extreme cases may even justify punitive damages.
289
 Latimore v. County of Contra Costa, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1994);
Mussington v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 427,432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 18
F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
290 See Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 9. But see Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 433.
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of disparate impact was dismissed before reaching the merits. 29 ' In
Latimore, however, the court properly allowed plaintiffs to take advan-
tage of the continuing violation doctrine to satisfy the requirements of
the statute of limitations. 292 As long as a health care facility continues
to be operated in a discriminatory fashion, the continuing violation
doctrine should be used to allow plaintiffs to challenge that facility.
Allowing plaintiffs to challenge any health care system operated
in a discriminatory fashion is appropriate because it will better achieve
the goals of the statute. More plaintiffs could use Title VI to seek an
equal distribution of health care resources. The statute of limitations
would no longer be an obstacle to plaintiffs. No undue hardship would
be placed on defendants by doing this because the doctrine of laches
would still operate to bar claims by plaintiffs who have unreasonably
delayed seeking remedies in a way that causes prejudice to the defen-
dant.29s A defendant could demonstrate the existence of prejudice, for
example, by showing that the plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise
objections prior to the start of construction on a new facility but that
they failed to do S0. 294 Such prejudice would not exist, however, in a
system that had long been administered in a discriminatory fashion if
plaintiffs could demonstrate the existence of a less discriminatory
alternative that equally served the defendants' interests. Thus, allowing
Title VI plaintiffs to take advantage of the continuing violation doc-
trine to satisfy the statute of limitations will appropriately lower the
burden on Title VI plaintiffs.
B. Less Discriminatory Alternatives
In addition to being able to benefit from the continuing violation
doctrine, the Title VI plaintiff should not bear the burden of demon-
291 See Mussington, 824 F.Supp. at 433; supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text for a
description of the Mussington court's analysis under the continuing violation doctrine.
292 Latimore, No. C 94-1257, slip op. at 8-12.
293 See Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 433-34. The laches doctrine should be used sparingly to
avoid a subversion of Title VI's goals. It should hot become a convenient method of vitiating all
Title VI liability for defendants who engage in discrimination. Laches is a particularly appropriate
doctrine for use in Tide VI cases; it is an equitable defense and Title VI is equitable in nature.
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 600-01 (White, J., plurality opinion). The proper application of the lathes
doctrine can help ensure that Title VI challenges to the location of health care facilities do not
become unfairly burdensome on defendants.
294 See Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 433-34. The Mussington Court found the existence of
prejudice where the plaintiffs did not file suit until after construction began. Id. That court
incorrectly failed, however, to give any weight to the fact that the plaintiffs had vigorously opposed
the challenged construction in the public forum more than two years before the plan was even
officially adopted. See id.
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strating the viability of a less discriminatory alternative to a challenged
plan with a disparate impact. 295 Under the current framework articu-
lated in Title VI cases, the plaintiff can rebut a defendant's showing of
necessity by producing evidence that a less discriminatory alternative
to the challenged plan is available. 296 Plaintiffs, however, may lack the
expertise necessary to formulate alternative, less discriminatory plans
with a high degree of specificity. 297 Further, they may not have adequate
information with which to evaluate whether a less discriminatory plan
will meet the legitimate goals of the defendant. 298 Defendants are thus
likely to be in a better position to accomplish both of these tasks."
For these reasons, the plaintiff should not have the burden of
demonstrating the existence of a less discriminatory alternative to a
challenged plan." Plaintiffs should be required specifically to articu-
late one or more reasonable but less discriminatory alternatives. The
defendant should then be required to demonstrate that those options
either are not, in fact, less discriminatory or, alternatively, are substan-
tially less effective in accomplishing the legitimate goals of the defen-
dant."' Though the plaintiff would not be required to fully document
the effect of alternative plans, the court should consider any relevant
information that the plaintiff provides when evaluating whether a
defendant has demonstrated the feasibility of less discriminatory alter-
natives. Despite speculation by some courts to the contrary, framing
the burdens in this way would not undesirably broaden the scope of
the courts' inquiry." The inquiry would remain focused on the spe-
cific alternatives articulated by the plaintiffs."
Removing this burden from plaintiffs would merely require defen-
dants to demonstrate that none of the plaintiffs' proposals for less
discriminatory options adequately serves their legitimate interests. To
the extent that plaintiffs' proposals were given full consideration in the
defendant's decision-making process, evidence that the process was
255 Watson, Reinvigorating Tide VI, supra note 2, at 975.
'296 Elston v. Talladega County 13d. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993); Watson,
Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 965.
257
 NAACP v. Medical Qr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1355 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 977.
298 See Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1355 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 977.
299 See Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1555 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 977.
3n° See Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, ,supra note 2, at 975-77.
5° 1 Id. at 977.
502 See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1980).
303 See Watson, Reinvigorating Tide VI, supra note 2, at 977.
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adequate and fair may be sufficient to meet this burden." In effect,
defendants would have to demonstrate not only the necessity of their
actions in adopting the challenged plan, but also why the particular
action chosen is the least discriminatory alternative that accomplishes
their legitimate objectives. Thus, placing the burden on the defendant
to demonstrate that no less discriminatory option is feasible appropri-
ately meets the goals of Title VI.
C. Split Between the Title VI Regulations and the Statute Itself
In addition to lessening the burdens on Title VI plaintiffs, courts
should also abolish the unjustified distinction that has been made
between the Title VI regulations and the Title VI statute. In Guardians,
the Supreme Court ruled that although Title VI itself does not prohibit
disparate impact, the Title VI regulations do." The Court had pre-
viously held that Congress delegated sufficient power to administrative
agencies to enable them to prohibit disparate impact." The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services has consistently enforced the
regulations it promulgated to prohibit disparate impact." Throughout
the history of Title VI, Congress has neither acted to change nor
expressed any disapproval of the disparate impact standard adopted
by the regulations, thereby indicating its assent to the use of Title VI
for that purpose." The ability of Title VI plaintiffs to use the statute
to challenge facially neutral policies with a disparate impact is the main
strength of the Title VI action." The ability of plaintiffs to use Title
VI to reach acts with a disparate impact is essential both because the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not reach uninten-
tional discrimination, and because other antidiscrimination statutes
that forbid disparate impact discrimination do not reach the health
care context.s'°
"4 See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 623-24 (Kearse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Mt Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n.27 (White, J., plurality
opinion), 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (1983); Elston v. Talladega County I3d. of Educ., 997
F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Gin 1984); Watson,
Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 2, at 952.
306 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974).
907 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592 (White, J., plurality opinion); Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI,
supra note 2, at 948.
5044 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592-93 (White, J., plurality opinion).
" See Randall, supra note 1, at 185; Perkins, supra note 2, at 379; Watson, Reinvigorating
Title VI, supra note 2, at 942.
510 Elstan, 997 F.2d at 1406; see supra note S.
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Because the prohibition against disparate impact discrimination
is attributed to the Title VI regulations, agency action might remove
that protection in the future. Recent critical attention focused on
affirmative action may indicate a turning away from the goal of elimi-
nating disparate adverse impact in this country. A future administra-
tion could order that the regulations be rewritten to forbid intentional
discrimination only, and the regulations would presumably be valid.
Thus, plaintiffs would lose their opportunity to remedy health care
discrimination on a showing of disparate impact. Such a significant
reduction in plaintiffs' rights should not be permitted without action
by Congress. 3" Thus, to avoid the possibility that someone might elimi-
nate all disparate impact claims, courts should abolish the current
distinction between the Title VI regulations and the statute itself.
Furthermore, because of congressional intent to make Title VI a pow-
erful tool to end discrimination in the use of federal funds and the
difficulty plaintiffs have thus far had in using it for that purpose, in the
context of health care facilities, courts should lower the burdens on
Title VI plaintiffs, allowing them to more easily combat disparate im-
pact in the location of health care facilities and the distribution of
health care resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VI challenges by private parties to the location of health care
facilities have not yet lived up to their potential as a tool for ending
discrimination in the use of federal funds. The recent debate over
health care reform and the ongoing debates about welfare reform and
affirmative action have brought increased attention to the health care
industry and its use of federal funds. Change in some direction is likely
in the near future. It is important to take this opportunity to ensure
that any new distribution of health care services is more equitable for
all segments of society than it has been in the past. Allowing enforce-
ment of a private right of action under Title VI, with a reduced burden
on plaintiffs and an increased burden on defendants, will help ensure
that each new siting of a health care facility moves toward, rather than
away from, a more even distribution of social resources.
DANIEL K. HAMPTON
311 Cf. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592 (Whited., plurality opinion) (noting that the Court should
give deference to the consistent administrative construction of the statute in the face of congres-
sional silence).
